Softly, Softly

On October 4, 2017, the FAA issued new regulations for noise certification standards on certain airplanes.  They become effective November 3, 2017.  Certification standards apply to the design and manufacture of an aircraft.  Operational rules apply to its operation.  Specifically, the new rules adopt:

a new noise standard for newly certificated subsonic jet airplanes and subsonic transport category large airplanes. By lowering the noise limit, this standard requires quieter designs and encourages manufacturers to adopt the latest available noise reduction technology into their aircraft designs. This rulemaking adopts new noise certification standards for airplanes certificated in the United States (known as Stage 5) that are equivalent to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 16, Volume I standard known as Chapter 14.

These new rules will not apply to launch or reentry vehicles because the law does not treat launch and reentry vehicles as aircraft.  Additionally, launch and reentry vehicles do not undergo certification. However, the new rules may serve as a reminder of what happens when noise overburdens a community.  The communities turn to Congress and demand that Congres take action.

Another interesting facet of the new rules is that the FAA describes its new standards as equivalent to the international standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization.  ICAO has expressed keen interest in suborbital launch vehicles.

Try to keep it down out there.

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Is it a Reentry Vehicle if it Doesn’t Return Substantially Intact?

Let’s say you plan to bring something in from outer space.  You might wonder whether it needs a reentry license from the Federal Aviation Administration.  The answer will depend on what you bring back. (It will also depend on a lot of other factors, such as your location and whether you are a citizen of the United States).  If you plan to reenter a reentry vehicle you do need an FAA reentry license.   When Congress gave the FAA authority over reentry of a reentry vehicle, it defined a reentry vehicle to mean “a vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, or a reusable launch vehicle designed to return from Earth orbit or outer space to Earth, substantially intact.”  If your object doesn’t satisfy the definition, you don’t need a reentry license.  This definition excludes, for example, satellites.

To qualify as a reentry vehicle, the vehicle needs to be designed to return form Earth orbit or outer space substantially intact, regardless of whether it’s a simple reentry vehicle or a reusable launch vehicle.  We know that the requirement that it be substantially intact applies to both reusable and non-reusable vehicles because we all remember the grammar rule about how if a modifier comes after a list of two things it modifies only the second thing unless there’s a comma.  Because of the location of the comma, “substantially intact” applies to both types of vehicles.  One thing we can tell from this definition is that reentry of most satellites would not need an FAA reentry license.

Easy cases. How do we figure out if a manufacturer designed a vehicle to return substantially intact?   Let’s take the easy scenarios first.  If one operator returns a capsule from space, lands it in the ocean, and pulls a bunch of rocks or science experiments out of it, it’s not a stretch at all to say that vehicle has returned substantially intact.  At the other end of the spectrum, another vehicle might take trash out of an orbiting habitat and be designed to burn up in the atmosphere.  It won’t need a license because it won’t return substantially intact.

Hard case.  Of course, real life will offer more difficult examples.  What do we say about a vehicle with a surviving chunk of titanium that reaches the surface of Earth ?  Titanium can survive reentry, but it’s not like the vehicle itself will come back substantially intact.   Satellites exist which have pieces that can survive the rigors of atmospheric reentry yet they are not designed to survive.  The risk numbers for Envisat, for example, indicated as much.  No, the definition requires the vehicle to be designed to return substantially intact.  A chunk of titanium alone hardly counts as a vehicle.  What if other bits of the vehicle and the chunk of titanium survive?  Then we have to figure out if those count as a vehicle and as “substantial.”

These types of questions will likely get worked out on a case by case basis.

 

 

 

 

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Procedural Protections of ASCFEA

As noted last week, the recently marked-up American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act would require a non-governmental U.S. entity operating a space object to obtain certification  from the Department of Commerce. Last week’s post addressed some of the substantive issues in the bill. This week, we’ll take a look at the procedural protections the bill would offer.

Organizations: The first item of interest is the location of the regulator. Although the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) has issued a handful of payload reviews over the years for non-traditional space operations, the House Committee does not believe all space activities will have a transportation nexus requiring the FAA’s regulatory culture. Accordingly, the bill would place regulatory oversight and certification authority in the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Commerce. The ASCFEA would provide that a space object whose operations are certificated by Commerce would not require an FAA payload review for purposes of determining consistency with national security, foreign policy, or international obligations. The FAA would, however, keep its authority to conduct a payload review for public health and safety and the safety of property. Presumably this means the FAA’s safety oversight would be confined to the safety of a launch or reentry, and not address the safety of an orbital habitat, lunar harpist, or Martian distillery. Some clarification may be in order if that is the case.

Numbers: The bill appears to require—but for all practical purposes at best encourages—the Secretary of Commerce to require, to the maximum extent practicable, only one certification for multiple operations of a single space object, for multiple space objects that carry out substantially similar operations, and for the use of multiple space objects to carry out a single operation. Although this language leaves much to the Secretary to decide about what constitutes an operation and whether it is single or multiple, there are advantages to the bill’s encouragement. First, it encourages the Secretary to treat certifications more like a driver’s license.  I go back to the State of Maryland in seven years for my license renewal, rather than every time I plan to get in my car.  This is more efficient.  The FAA offers a similar authorization called the launch operator license. Inspection of the active license list shows that it issues both launch operator, which is like a driver’s license, and launch specific–which applies to only particular launches–licenses. (Yes, the terminology is confusing because all operators of a launch vehicle are called launch operators.) For a Secretary so inclined, certification may efficiently cover more activities than not. A disadvantage to the bill’s approach is that it leaves that determination up to the Secretary, who may have a very narrow definition as to whether another operation is substantially similar enough to come under a single certification or not. Operators would have to seek interpretations from the Secretary repeatedly so as not to run afoul of the law, an exercise which may cause delay as much as obtaining a modification to an existing certification would.

Application requirements: Interestingly, the proposed legislation spells out the application requirements, thus limiting the ability of the Secretary to engage in far-ranging fishing expeditions. Typically, legislation does not do this, which means that a regulatory agency may ask for any information that may arguably fit within its authority. Additionally, a regulatory agency might ask for highly detailed information, but the bill states that an application “shall include only the following information….” (emphasis added).

After reviewing the application, if the Secretary determines that the application satisfies the statutory requirements, the Secretary must approve the application. If the Secretary denies the application (and only the Secretary may issue a denial), the Secretary must provide the applicant in writing a clearly articulated rationale for the denial that provides the applicant guidance on how to address the issue in a subsequent application. The Secretary must also inform the Congressional oversight committee of the reason for the denial. We may hope that Congressional oversight would ensure that any denial was solidly grounded in a statutory basis.

If the Secretary does not make a determination within the deadline, the certification “shall be approved without condition.” This provides an obvious incentive for the Secretary to make a determination because failing to decide means approving. Even if the Secretary’s review is slowed by other agencies, their failure to provide a response in a timely way will not mean that the decision gets put off but that a decision is forced. This would likely provide a disincentive for consulting with other agencies in the interest of time, and it might force other agencies who do get consulted to be able to explain themselves very quickly if they have a serious issue.

Tolling:  The Secretary may not toll the review period. This is also rather clever.  Review of a similar scenario may provide context.  The FAA has a statutory limit on how long it may take to conduct a review of a launch, reentry, or site license. If the FAA’s review takes longer than 180 days, the FAA must notify the House oversight committee within 30 days. In an attempt to be nice to applicants who submit incomplete applications, which happens, the FAA instituted the practice of tolling—stopping the clock from running on the 180 days—if the FAA has to wait for additional information for the application to be complete. This is nice (and, yes, “nice” is a legal principle) because, while it saves the FAA from having to deny an application for incomplete information, it saves the applicant from being denied a license and having to start the 180-day clock all over again from the beginning.

What happened, however, was that rather than appreciating the niceness no one liked being tolled. This provision may reflect that distaste. With the statute spelling out relatively straightforward application requirements, tolling should be unnecessary.  Additionally, with the shorter review period, it looks like it will be less painful to have to re-submit an application.  The lack of tolling would force a very clear decision process on the Secretary.  If an applicant failed to provide all required information or attestations, the Secretary (without delegating to the Office of Space Commerce) would have to deny the application him or herself. This would involve the Secretary in oversight of the application review period, which could lead to inquiries as to why the applicant wasn’t told sooner that information was missing.

What is most interesting, however, is that lacking the ability to toll makes it hard for the regulator to ask follow-up questions that may exceed the information required by statute. Any request for “more” that might result in issuing a denial will reach the attention of both the Secretary and the House oversight committee. A request for “more’ that merely misses the deadline will result in approval.  This may help keep the regulator confined to its statutory mission rather than seeking to add to it.  Fishing expeditions that exceeded the agency’s statutory authority would result in the clock running out and the deadline being missed.  If the Secretary is not able to articulate a rational basis for a denial, approval would be automatic.  In short, although at any given moment an applicant might wish tolling was available, in the long run its lack should force everyone to communicate issues more quickly so they might be solved, or recognize that they are too amorphous to reduce to a clearly articulated rationale, which is what would be necessary for a lawful denial.

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Inflating the Penalties for Commercial Space Transportation

To account for inflation, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a final rule that adjusts the fines—“civil penalties” in FAA lingo—that the agency may impose for violations of its regulations and statutes. The agency has to do this because several laws require inflation adjustments to ensure that the threatened fines of regulatory agencies continue to have a deterrent effect.   The laws include the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, and, most recently, the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. The 2015 Act amended the formula for and frequency of agency inflation adjustments, requiring an initial “catch-up” adjustment, followed by annual adjustments of civil penalty amounts using a statutorily mandated formula. The FAA implemented the initial adjustment in July 2016. This new rule provides the first of the annual adjustments. The FAA notes that the new law:

provides a formula for annual inflationary adjustments that increase civil penalty maximums and minimums by a cost-of- living adjustment (COLA). Under the FCPIAA, as amended by the 2015 Act, the COLA for each civil penalty is the percent change between the U.S. Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers (CPI–U) for the month of October of the calendar year preceding the adjustment and the CPI–U for the month of October of the previous calendar year. Any resulting increase must be rounded to the nearest $1.

*          *          *

To derive the 2017 adjustment, the FAA must multiply the maximum or minimum penalty amount by the percent change between the October 2016 CPI–U and the October 2015 CPI– U. In this case, October 2016 CPI–U (241.729)/October 2015 CPI–U (237.838) = Multiplier (1.01636).5 Accordingly, the agency multiplied the civil penalty maximums and minimums provided in current 14 CFR 13.301 and 406.9 by 1.01636 to derive the updated maximums and minimums provided in this final rule.

Relying on an interpretation of the 2015 law from the Office of Management and Budget, the FAA did not issue a notice of proposed rulemaking for public comment. This final rule changes the minimum and maximum penalties effective April 10, 2017, the day the rule was published in the Federal Register.

The FAA’s space transportation regulations do not contain minimum or maximum penalties like the FAA’s aviation regulations do. Instead, the commercial space regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 406.9, implements the single penalty listed in 51 U.S.C. ch. 509 (aka the Commercial Space Launch Act). When Congress initially granted the FAA the authority to impose civil penalties, it capped the amount at $100,000.00 per violation per day. 51 U.S.C. § 50917. The United States Code still says that. With the passage of its various inflation adjustment laws, Congress mandated a global search and replace on civil penalties, including those imposed for violations of space regulations. Thus, the FAA’s own new requirement now says:

14 C.F.R. § 406.9 Civil Penalties.

(a) Civil penalty liability. Under 51 U.S.C. 50917(c), a person found by the FAA to have violated a requirement of the Act, a regulation issued under the Act, or any term or condition of a license or permit issued or transferred under the Act, is liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than $229,562 for each violation. A separate violation occurs for each day the violation continues.

The FAA will not necessarily claim a civil penalty as high as that, and, to my knowledge, has yet to do so.  Agencies are allowed discretion in deciding the size of a penalty, and will typically attempt to impose smaller fines for first-time violations.

 

 

 

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Testimony to House Space Subcommittee

What follows is my written testimony to the House Space Subcommittee on the role the Outer Space Treaty plays in the regulatory responsibilities of the United States.  It’s long, and much of it will be familiar to regular Ground Based readers, but there are some new thoughts regarding paths forward, and it puts together what I have covered here over the past months.

Testimony of Laura Montgomery

Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Subcommittee on Space

Regulating Space: Innovation, Liberty, and International Obligations

March 8, 2017, Rayburn Building

 

Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in this important discussion and to address the role Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty plays in the regulatory responsibilities of the United States. As someone who hopes to see people beyond Low Earth Orbit again in my lifetime, and who hopes to see commercial space operations other than launches, reentries, and communications satellites, I respectfully recommend that the United States not regulate new commercial space activities such as lunar habitats, mining, satellite servicing, or lunar beer brewing for the wrong reason: the belief that Article VI makes the United States regulate either any particular activity or all activities of U.S. citizens in outer space. Regulations already cost American industry, the economy, and the ultimate consumer upwards of four trillion dollars, according to recent research from the Mercatus Center,[1] so we should think carefully before creating more drag on the space sector.

A misunderstanding of the Outer Space Treaty looms as possible regulatory drag, because many claim Article VI of the treaty prohibits operations in outer space unless the government authorizes and supervises—which I’ll refer to as “oversees” or “regulates”—those activities. Although Article VI states that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty,” to interpret this as forbidding unauthorized, private space activity is wrong for three reasons. The treaty does not forbid private operators from operating in outer space. It does not say that either all or any particular activity must be authorized. And, finally, Article VI is not, under U.S. law, self-executing, which means that it does not create an obligation on the private sector unless Congress says it does.

In order to put to bed the regulatory uncertainty arising out of these misunderstandings, Congress could take a number of different approaches. The most certain and long-lasting approach, however, and the one that would reduce the opportunities for confusion, misunderstanding, and regulatory overreach, would be for Congress to prohibit any regulatory agency from denying a U.S. entity the ability to operate in outer space on the basis of Article VI. Continue reading

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For Whom the Clock Starts, For Whom it Stops, and Tolling

When a launch or reentry operator applies for a launch or reentry license from the Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA has 180 days to determine whether to grant the license or not. This time limit comes from  the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA), 51 U.S.C. ch. 509, and the FAA has to follow it. This sounds very simple, but, of course, it isn’t. Because Congress did not specify how the FAA is to count the days, the FAA’s regulations, which it must follow under Supreme Court case law, start and stop the clock based on whether the FAA has enough information in the application to start working on it.

The clock starts. When does the clock start counting down? Might an applicant submit its name and address and have the clock start running? No.

Under the FAA’s rules the clock starts when an applicant submits an accepted application.  An accepted license application is one that is “complete enough for the FAA to start its review.” In other words, the applicant has to provide enough information for the FAA to start figuring out if the operator can satisfy, among other things, the FAA’s safety and financial requirements. That’s when the clock starts ticking.

The FAA can afford this approach because it has the ability to “toll” its review: it can stop the clock. As the regulations note, “[t]he FAA’s acceptance of an application does not mean it has determined that the application is complete.”

The clock stops. If the FAA has an application that does not contain all the necessary information, the FAA will toll the review period under section 413.15(b). To do that, the FAA writes to the applicant and requests the missing information. Although this part is not in the rules, the FAA’s notification of the applicant that the agency needs more information will contain a date by which the applicant should submit the information to avoid tolling. If the applicant provides the information before that date, the clock does not stop. If the FAA does not receive the requested information, the clock stops on the specified date. For example, let’s say that on Day 50 of the review period the FAA writes the applicant requesting information about an applicant’s safety official because the applicant doesn’t seem to have one. The FAA requests the information by April 5, which is Day 60. The applicant does not provide the information. Although the FAA may keep working on the application, it will toll the review period, and the clock doesn’t start again until May 1, when the applicant finally provides the FAA the identity of its safety official.

This system is actually a great benefit to the applicant. If tolling were unavailable, the FAA would have to deny the license application at 180 days for missing information, and the clock would reset to Day 0.

Another interesting point is that both the CSLA and the FAA’s regulations state that the FAA must inform the applicant in writing of any additional information the agency needs if it hasn’t made its final determination at 120 days.

Thus we see that the FAA, in accordance with Congressional direction and expectations, structured its regulations on this topic to allow an applicant to submit an incomplete application, albeit one that is “complete enough” for the FAA to start its review. Were the FAA to change this approach it would have to change its regulations.

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Science Fiction, Space Law, and the Regulatory State: Or, How John Varley Broke My Heart but Other Science Fiction Writers Shouldn’t Have To

redthunder-from-amazonI read John Varley in my teens. I had a subscription to Analog, or, Galaxy, it might have been; and Varley’s short stories showed up there regularly. He was really close to Heinlein in my pantheon of favorite authors. I read The Ophiuchi Hotline when it came out, and waited eagerly for Titan and its sequels.

I grew up, I went to law school, I worked for a law firm.   I changed jobs and became a space lawyer for the Federal Aviation Administration and worked on commercial space transportation issues under the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA). (Of course, none of the views expressed here represent those of my former employer, especially the stuff about John Varley). So, about a decade ago, when I saw Red Thunder, a really fun book about a group of young people with a secret space engine trying to get to Mars before anyone else, I was very happy to pick it up.

Reading it was just heaven, until it got to a certain point: the point where our heroes agreed amongst themselves they didn’t need much in the way of regulatory approvals, aside from getting clearance from the FAA’s Air Traffic (which, if I recall correctly, everything being secret and all, I don’t think they bothered with). But, and here’s the sad part, the characters made no mention of FAA launch licensing.  They only defied Air Traffic , but they should have also defied the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation.

How could John Varley have let me down like this? He could talk about Air Traffic control, but not about the licensing requirements of the Commercial Space Launch Act? What was wrong with him? Did science fiction writers have no regard for the law? Michael Flynn knew about the CSLA, and its administrators showed up as petty bureaucrats in Firestar. That was cool. He was up to snuff. But John Varley? Continue reading

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Unlicensed Government Launches

Under 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509 (the Commercial Space Launch Act or Chapter 509) a U.S. person requires a license to launch or reenter a launch or reentry vehicle . The U.S. Government, however, does not. Chapter 509 specifically states in section 50919 (emphasis added) that

(g) This chapter does not apply to—

(A) a launch, reentry, operation of a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, operation of a launch site or reentry site, or other space activity the Government carries out for the Government; or

(B) planning or policies related to the launch, reentry, operation, or activity under subparagraph (A).

This creates a two-part test. A launch operator need not obtain an FAA license if 1) the U.S. Government is the launch operator (the Government “carries out” the launch), and if 2) the payload belongs to the Government (the launch is “for the Government”). If the launch company Xanadu takes a government payload to orbit, Xanadu needs an FAA license. When NASA carried out Shuttle launches, which were by and for the government, it did not need an FAA license.

This all seems pretty easy, but it isn’t. Unlike Dan Brown in Deception Point, most of us know that private companies design, build, and launch rockets. Private companies are even involved in government launches. So how is it that we say that the government ever carries out a launch?

This question became a point of contention between NASA and the Department of Transportation in 1990, before the Office of Commercial Space Transportation  moved to the FAA. In an opinion, the bulk of which erroneously analyzes the question based on whose waiver-of-claims agreements apply, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice reviewed whether General Dynamics’ launch of a payload called CRRES required a license. NASA had entered into a launch services contract with General Dynamics Corporation under which General Dynamics agreed to provide all supplies and services necessary to design, test, and launch the CRRES payload into orbit. For this launch, title to the vehicle remained with General Dynamics. General Dynamics obtained a launch license from the Department of Transportation, but NASA thought it didn’t need one. On November 15, 1990, the Department of Justice stated that the Department of Transportation’s launch licensing authority did not apply to launches where the Government was so substantially involved that it effectively directed or controlled the launch.

This pronouncement became a litmus test of sorts for determining whether a government agency was “carrying out” the launch. If the agency was effectively directing or controlling the launch, it was carrying it out. These might be different words meaning the same thing, but, regardless of the phrasing, figuring out whether the government is carrying out a launch should be a fact-based inquiry.

First the “Don’ts.” 1. Don’t confuse the government’s status as a customer—which is the second part of the two-part test—with the question of whether it is carrying out a launch. There are many satellite manufacturers who contract for launch services. No one thinks they are carrying out the launch. 2. Don’t think that being “substantially involved” in a launch is enough to carry it out. It is possible to be substantially involved in a launch, and many customers are, and not be carrying it out.

There may be a series of useful questions to ask about the activity itself to determine who is carrying it out. Whose employees are on console? For whom does the mission director work? Who performs the trajectory analysis? Who has which go/no go decisions? How are those decisions qualitatively different from those of a commercial customer putting up a comsat?

There is a school of thought that being substantially involved in designing a launch vehicle means one can claim to be carrying out the launch. That seems at odd with the statutory requirement of “carrying out,” which denotes an activity.   After all, an aircraft manufacturer is not said to be flying or operating an aircraft just because it designed it.

The ultimate question remains unsettled. People more familiar with the launch process may have better or more questions than these, but a proper determination will attempt to address these questions or others like them.

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Space Insurance: Duration of Coverage

When the FAA licenses, or issues a permit for, a launch or reentry of a launch or reentry vehicle, the FAA requires that the licensee or permittee obtain insurance coverage for damages that may arise out of the FAA-authorized activity. This coverage would apply to third party liability and to government property.

Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 440.11 and 440.12, require that coverage extend for longer than the duration of the ordinary meanings of launch and reentry. For a launch, insurance must attach when the licensed launch or permitted activity starts, and the insurance must remain full force and effect until either 1) completion of licensed launch or permitted activities at a launch or reentry site; and 2) for orbital launch until the later of: a) 30 days following payload separation, or attempted payload separation in the event of a payload separation anomaly; or b) 30 days from ignition of the launch vehicle.

For a suborbital launch, insurance must continue until the later of motor impact and payload recovery; or the FAA determines that risk to third parties and Government property as a result of licensed launch or permitted activities is sufficiently small that financial responsibility is no longer necessary. The FAA makes that determination through the risk analysis it conducts before the launch to determine maximum probable loss.

For reentry of a reentry vehicle, which includes a reusable launch vehicle, insurance must remain in effect as follows: for ground operations, until completion of licensed reentry at the reentry site; and for other licensed reentry activities, 30 days from initiation of reentry flight; however, in the event of an abort that results in the reentry vehicle remaining on orbit, insurance must remain in place until the FAA’s determination that risk to third parties and Government property as a result of licensed reentry is sufficiently small that financial responsibility is no longer necessary, as determined by the FAA through the risk analysis conducted to determine maximum probable loss.

Note that because the statutory definition of launch is very broad, the requirements for insurance coverage apply to what 14 C.F.R. part 417 calls “launch processing,” namely, preparations for launch. Specifically, 51 U.S.C. § 50902(7) defines launch to include “activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle or payload for launch, when those activities take place at a launch site in the United States.” Note as well that 14 C.F.R. § 401.5 defines launch differently depending on whether a launch takes place under license or permit.

 

 

 

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Article VI, the FAA’s Payload Review, and Foreign Policy Considerations

After last Friday’s post on the Outer Space Treaty’s Article VI, which states that the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate state party to the treaty, I had some interesting conversations on the topic at a couple of conferences. One person pointed out that the FAA’s payload review authority allowed the FAA to take foreign policy interests into account when making a payload determination. This is true and not inappropriate, but should not be applied for Article VI reasons in light of the fact that the provision is not self-executing.

When conducting a payload review, the FAA must do so consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, national security and foreign policy interests. The FAA’s foreign policy authority may be a double-edged sword for industry. (If it were a light saber, we’d speak of whether it glowed blue or red.)

On the one hand, the FAA could use its powers to encourage, facilitate and promote. For example, were a prospective lunar harpist to seek a payload determination from the FAA, the FAA would engage in its normal practice of inter-agency consultation. The U.S. Department of State might raise concerns with respect to the fact that Congress has not passed legislation to regulate harp playing despite Article VI providing that all States Parties to the treaty authorize and continuously supervise the acts of their nationals in outer space. With its own foreign policy authority, independent of that of the State Department, the FAA could determine that because Article VI is not self-executing, until Congress acts, the U.S. has not determined that playing the harp constitutes the type of activity requiring oversight under Article VI.  Having satisfied its consultation obligations the FAA could then issue a favorable payload determination.

Conversely, the FAA could worry that other countries might raise issues about Article VI authorization and continuing supervision of a lunar harpist and contemplate denying the harpist’s requested payload determination. Such a determination should, however, run afoul of the fact that Congress has not determined that lunar harp playing is the kind of activity that requires federal oversight. The FAA must make any policy determinations in accordance with U.S. law, and a non-self-executing treaty is not, as noted by the Supreme Court’s Medellin opinion, binding federal law. To treat it as such would raise the question of whether the FAA was usurping Congress’s legislative role.

Lunar harp playing is a vaguely ludicrous example of an activity that could take place extra terrestrially, but it makes the point that the Outer Space Treaty left the determinations of what requires authorization and continuing supervision to each signatory nation. If Congress hasn’t decided that lunar harpists or miners require oversight for their respective activities, they don’t.  The treaty does not say which activities must be regulated, and in the United States that determination lies with Congress. For the FAA to say that it had the ability to make such determinations about a non-self-executing treaty would be to say that it, rather than the legislative branch, could decide which activities required federal oversight.

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