A couple weeks ago, NASA released a report of its Independent Review Board on Planetary Protection. NASA asked that the board assess the scientific, engineering, industrial, legal, and program management aspects of planetary protection.
Background. NASA directed the review board to assess how NASA’s planetary protection policies could be reviewed and streamlined, and how to address both new planetary missions and the entry the private sector. The report itself defines planetary protection as:
(i) managing contact between terrestrial life forms and organic material from celestial bodies as it relates to adversely affecting the scientific study of these bodies, [which is] called forward contamination; and (ii) mitigating harmful contact between pathogens or biology from other celestial bodies and terrestrial biology, [which is] called backward contamination.
It is important to recognize at the outset that NASA’s planetary protection policies are mandatory only for NASA. The Outer Space Treaty provision most relied upon by commenters and the press, Article IX, does not mandate planetary protection. Instead, it says that States Parties must pursue their studies and explorations so as to avoid “harmful contamination” of the moon and other celestial bodies. As a science agency that is part of the U.S. Government, NASA has applied this admonition to its missions so that it not only avoids what the ordinary person might consider harmful contamination–toxins, poisons, peanuts–but microbial contamination as well. NASA itself describes its policy only as “consistent with” Article IX, rather than required by it. Others may, after all, define “harmful contamination” differently than NASA does.
The report. For the most part, the report reviews matters that are not too controversial. However, it does make some troubling observations that may merit further analysis going forward.
First, after recognizing that the context in which planetary protection occurs is undergoing rapid change, the report states:
For planetary missions involving locations of high astrobiological potential, it is essential that forward and backward contamination consideration be integral to mission implementation. This applies to both government and private sector missions.
Although it is possible that the writers of the report intended the importance of considering contamination to apply to private sector missions, it appears to say that the planetary protection policy itself applies to private sector missions. The report offers no legal support for this assertion, or analysis to demonstrate its validity. As noted above, the treaty does not require planetary protection. Moreover, its admonition against harmful contamination applies to States parties, not to non-governmental entities, and this provision is not self-executing when looked at through the lens of the Supreme Court case, Medellin. See also, US Regulators May Not Prevent Private Space Activity on the Basis of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Were NASA to attempt to impose the policy through the FAA’s payload review, NASA and the FAA would be arrogating to themselves the legislative authority that the Constitution gave to Congress. In short, until Congress passes a new law saying so, NASA’s planetary protection policies do not apply to the private sector.
On a more positive note, the report recognizes that the Outer Space Treaty’s call for avoiding “harmful contamination” may be pursued by means other than adherence to NASA’s planetary protection guidelines:
COSPAR PP guidelines have evolved to be an internationally recognized, voluntary standard for protection of scientific interests in celestial bodies. Adherence to the COSPAR guidelines has been considered an acceptable mechanism for establishing a State party’s compliance with the harmful contamination aspects in Article IX of the OST. Adherence to COSPAR PP guidelines have constituted one type of mechanism for establishing compliance with Article IX, but this is not the only such compliance mechanism; other mechanisms that may be more appropriate also exist
My last concern may be one of tone. Although the report acknowledges that the planetary protection policies are not mandatory and offer only one interpretation for addressing the treaty’s concerns about harmful contamination, the report speaks as if the government–whether NASA, the FAA, or Congress–needs to do something to enable the private sector to go forward. For example, a “major recommendation” of the report states:
Regarding PP, NASA should work in support of the Administration’s efforts, and as appropriate with the Congress and private sector stakeholders, to enable private sector space initiatives that do not have significant NASA involvement.
The law already allows private operators who have not contracted* with NASA to proceed with regard to planetary protection. Congress needs to pass a law before planetary protection applies to the private sector. The FAA’s efforts to the contrary likely exceed its jurisdiction.
*I’m assuming that these vague references to “significant NASA involvement” means that a private company has a contract with NASA for the company to build something or perform a service for NASA. In that contract, NASA may impose its planetary protection policies on the private company. That scenario could be what is meant by “significant NASA involvement.”