The President’s Space Resources Executive Order and the Moon Agreement

As you may recall, on April 6, the President issued an  Executive Order stating U.S. policy on the recovery and use of resources in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and provides guidance to the State Department on how to address such issues in the international arena.  Among other things, the President said:

the United States does not consider the Moon Agreement to be an effective or necessary instrument to guide nation states regarding the promotion of commercial participation in the long-term exploration, scientific discovery, and use of the Moon, Mars, or other celestial bodies. Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall object to any attempt by any other state or international organization to treat the Moon Agreement as reflecting or otherwise expressing customary international law.

On April 24, 2020, SpaceWatch.Global published an interview with Christopher Johnson of the Secure World Foundation, where he analyzed, among other things, the status of the 1979 Moon Agreement, an international agreement the U.S. has not agreed to.  It would establish what is effectively a regime of redistribution.

Johnson points out that no one should be surprised by the United States’ rejection of the Moon Agreement.  After all, the U.S. rejected it back when it first appeared:

The Executive Order explicitly rejects the 1979 Moon Agreement. How do you think this will be received by other countries, particularly other major space powers?

It will not be surprising to any other major serious space powers, or even to any middle space powers. No major space powers are party to the Moon Agreement (MA), nor any middle power. Austria and Netherlands are both parties to the MA, which will make them unattractive jurisdictions to incorporate any commercial space enterprise, in my opinion. Regrettably, it seems to be the policy of the Dutch government to never back out of an international agreement it has signed, no matter if the situation changes, and it is no longer in the national interest to be a party. France has signed but not ratified it, and apparently has no intention to ever ratify.

Australia is a party, and I would ask if being a party to the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement at the same time creates problems, as they seem to create inconsistent rights and obligations. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Australian government re-evaluated its membership in the Moon Agreement club. For those States which are a party to the MA, I don’t know if they can lawfully participate in any deep space exploration which is operationally dependent on using space resources, as the Moon Agreement arguably prohibits such use.

Johnson explains that this latest rejection is necessary because the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been discussing how to govern space resources.  Some of the delegates have been urging adoption of the Moon Agreement.

Unsurprisingly, delegations from Moon Agreement States have done this. There are fans of the Moon Agreement, who are often more fans of international law than of space activity, and see it as their hobby to promote the Moon Agreement. Whether their capitals back home know they are promoting the Moon Agreement is a good question.

The Executive Order’s repeated and explicit rejection of the Moon Agreement signals strongly that the international community needs to find another path:

Let’s go another path, using national law, the Hague Space Resources Building Blocks, bi-lateral and mini-lateral arrangements, and whatever is practical coming from COPUOS, as a better path. There may be good ideas in the Moon Agreement, but there are enough bad and uncertain ideas that, frankly, it’s just not fit to regulate this activity in a productive or sustainable fashion. And more importantly, politically, the Moon Agreement is radioactive, so it’s not really worth any further serious reference in shaping norms for space resource activity.

Read the whole interview.  Johnson explains why space is not a global commons, and describes his own views on the President’s strategic and economic thinking.